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Abstract
We revisit the problem of revising probabilistic beliefs using uncertain evidence, and report re-
sults on several major issues relating to this problem: how should one specify uncertain evidence?
How should one revise a probability distribution? How should one interpret informal evidential state-
ments? Should, and do, iterated belief revisions commute? And what guarantees can be offered on
the amount of belief change induced by a particular revision? Our discussion is focused on two main
methods for probabilistic revision: Jeffrey’s rule of probability kinematics and Pearl’s method of vir-
tual evidence, where we analyze and unify these methods from the perspective of the questions posed
above.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We consider in this paper the problem of revising probabilistic beliefs using uncertain
evidence, where beliefs are represented by a probability distribution. There are two main
methods for revising probabilistic beliefs in this case. The first method is known as Jef-
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frey’s rule and is based on the principle of probability kinematics, which can be viewed
as a principle for minimizing belief change [8]. The second method is called the virtual
evidence method and was proposed by Pearl in the context of belief networks, even though
it can be easily generalized to arbitrary probability distributions, and is based on recasting
uncertain evidence as hard evidence on some virtual event [11]. We will analyze both of
these methods with respect to the following questions:
(1) How should one specify uncertain evidence?
(2) How should one revise a probability distribution?
(3) How should one interpret informal evidential statements?
(4) Should, and do, iterated belief revisions commute?
(5) What guarantees can be offered on the amount of belief change induced by a particular
revision?
To answer the first question, we note that uncertain evidence must be specified as a
formal constraint on posterior beliefs. This could be an absolute constraint on posterior be-
liefs, or a relative constraint on how posterior beliefs should relate to prior beliefs. Yet, the
constraint induced by a given evidence will usually not define posterior beliefs uniquely,
hence, we need to adopt a principle that commits us to a unique set of posterior beliefs that
satisfy the given constraint. This principle will then define the belief revision method. But
even if we choose a method for specifying evidence formally, and a method for revising
beliefs, there is still the problem of interpreting informal evidential statements, which are
usually specified in natural language. These statements may not map directly to our formal
specification language for evidence, and it is this process of interpretation that appears to
underlie most of the controversies on revision methods.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method
both revise beliefs using the principle of probability kinematics. Whereas Jeffrey’s rule ex-
plicitly commits to this principle, Pearl’s method is based on a different revision principle,
yet it implicitly implies the principle of probability kinematics, leading to the same revision
method as that of Jeffrey’s. The difference between Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method is in
the way uncertain evidence is specified. Jeffrey requires uncertain evidence to be specified
in terms of the effect it has on beliefs once accepted, which is a function of both evidence
strength and beliefs held before the evidence is obtained. Pearl, on the other hand, requires
uncertain evidence to be specified in terms of its strength only. Despite this difference, we
will show that one can easily translate between the two methods of specifying evidence
and provide the equations for carrying out this translation.
The multiplicity of methods for specifying evidence also raises an important question:
how should informal statements about evidence be captured formally using available meth-
ods? For example, what should the following statement translate to: “Seeing these clouds,
I believe there is an 80% chance that it will rain?” We will discuss the differences in inter-
preting informal evidential statements, where we emphasize its subtlety and show how it
appears to be the culprit in reaching different conclusions by different revision methods.
As to the question of iterated belief revisions, it is well known that Jeffrey’s rule does
not commute, and hence, the order in which different pieces of uncertain evidence are
accepted matters [4]. This has long been perceived as a problem, until clarified recently
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by the work of Wagner who observed that the method of specifying evidence used by
Jeffrey’s rule is dependent on what is believed before the evidence is obtained, and hence,
should not be commutative to start with [13]. Wagner proposed a method for specifying
evidence, based on the notion of a Bayes factor, and argued that this method specifies
only the strength of evidence, and is independent of the beliefs held before attaining the
evidence. Wagner argued that when evidence is specified in this particular way, iterated
revisions should commute. He even showed that combining this method for specifying
evidence with the principle of probability kinematics leads to a revision rule that commutes.
We will actually show that Pearl’s method of virtual evidence specifies evidence according
to Bayes factors, exactly as proposed by Wagner, and hence, corresponds exactly to the
proposal he calls for. Therefore, the results we will discuss in this paper unify the two
main methods of probabilistic belief revision proposed by Jeffrey and Pearl, and show
that differences between them amount only to a difference in the protocol for specifying
uncertain evidence.
Our last set of results relate to the problem of providing guarantees on the amount of
belief change induced by a revision. We have recently proposed a distance measure for
bounding belief change, and showed how one can use it to provide such guarantees [1].
We will demonstrate how this distance measure can be computed when one distribution
is obtained from another using the principle of probability kinematics. The guarantees
provided by this distance measure can be realized when applying either Jeffrey’s rule or
Pearl’s method, since they both perform revisions based on the principle of probability
kinematics.
Proofs of all theorems in this paper can be found in Appendix A.
2. Probability kinematics and Jeffrey’s rule
Consider the problem of revising a probability distribution Pr given uncertain evidence
relating to a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn. One method of
specifying uncertain evidence is through the effect that it would have on beliefs once ac-
cepted. Specifically, according to this method, we have to specify evidence by providing
the following set of probabilities:
Pr′(γi) = qi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
where Pr′ denotes the new probability distribution that results from accepting the given
evidence. To revise the distribution Pr, we must therefore choose a unique posterior dis-
tribution Pr′ that satisfies the above constraint. The principle of probability kinematics,
which we define next, assumes that the conditional belief in any event α given any γi
remains unchanged.
Definition 1 [8]. Suppose that two probability distributions Pr and Pr′ disagree on the
probabilities they assign to a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn.
The distribution Pr′ is said to be obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on γ1, . . . , γn,
iff for every event α in the probability space:
Pr(α | γi) = Pr′(α | γi), for i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
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This concept was proposed by Jeffrey [8] to capture the notion that even though Pr and
Pr′ disagree on the probabilities of events γ1, . . . , γn, they agree on their relevance to every
event α.
We now introduce the belief revision method of Jeffrey’s rule [8], which can be viewed
as being comprised of two components: a suggestion to specify uncertain evidence as a
constraint on the posterior probabilities of events γ1, . . . , γn; and a proposal to choose the
posterior distribution using the principle of probability kinematics.
Definition 2 (Jeffrey’s Rule). Given an original distribution Pr and some uncertain evidence
bearing on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn, and assuming that
such evidence is specified by the set of posterior probabilities:
Pr′(γi) = qi, for i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
the new posterior distribution Pr′ proposed by Jeffrey’s rule is as follows:
Pr′(α) def=
n∑
i=1
qi
Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
. (3)
Theorem 1. The posterior distribution Pr′ given in Eq. (3) is the one and only distribution
that satisfies the constraint in Eq. (2) and that is obtained from Pr by probability kinematics
on γ1, . . . , γn.
We stress here that we are drawing a distinction between the principle of probability
kinematics and the revision method of Jeffrey’s rule, which are often considered synony-
mous. As we have mentioned, Jeffrey’s rule arises from a combination of two proposals:
(1) the principle of probability kinematics;
(2) the specification of uncertain evidence using a posterior distribution.
It is possible for one to combine the principle of probability kinematics with other methods
for specifying evidence, as we will discuss later.
We now show an example of using Jeffrey’s rule.
Example 1 (Due to Jeffrey). Assume that we are given a piece of cloth, where its color
can be one of: green (cg), blue (cb), or violet (cv). We want to know whether, on the next
day, the cloth will be sold (s), or not sold (s¯). Our original state of belief is given by the
distribution Pr:
Pr(s, cg) = 0.12, Pr(s, cb) = 0.12, Pr(s, cv) = 0.32,
Pr(s¯, cg) = 0.18, Pr(s¯, cb) = 0.18, Pr(s¯, cv) = 0.08.
Therefore, our original state of belief on the color of the cloth is given by (Pr(cg),Pr(cb),
Pr(cv)) = (0.3,0.3,0.4). Assume that we now inspect the cloth by candlelight, and con-
clude that our new state of belief on the color of the cloth should be (Pr′(cg),Pr′(cb),
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Pr′(cv)) = (0.7,0.25,0.05). If we revise our beliefs by applying Jeffrey’s rule (Eq. (3)),
we get the new distribution Pr′:
Pr′(s, cg) = 0.28, Pr′(s, cb) = 0.10, Pr′(s, cv) = 0.04,
Pr′(s¯, cg) = 0.42, Pr′(s¯, cb) = 0.15, Pr′(s¯, cv) = 0.01.
3. Virtual evidence and Pearl’s method
The problem of revising a probability distribution using uncertain evidence can be ap-
proached from a different perspective than that of the principle of probability kinematics.
For example, when we have uncertain evidence about some mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive events γ1, . . . , γn, we can recast this evidence as hard evidence on some virtual
event η, where the relevance of γ1, . . . , γn to η is uncertain. According to this approach,
the uncertainty regarding evidence on γ1, . . . , γn is now interpreted as uncertainty in the
relevance of γ1, . . . , γn to the virtual event η, and this uncertainty is specified by the like-
lihood of γi given this virtual evidence η, Pr(η | γi), for i = 1, . . . , n. This belief revision
method, called the virtual evidence method, is defined explicitly as follows.
Definition 3 (Virtual evidence method). Given an original distribution Pr and some uncer-
tain evidence η bearing on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn,
and assuming that such evidence is specified by λ1, . . . , λn such that:
Pr(η | γ1) : · · · : Pr(η | γn) = λ1 : · · · : λn, (4)
the revised distribution proposed by the virtual evidence method is Pr(· | η). Moreover, this
method assumes that for every event α in the probability space, we have:
Pr(η | γi, α) = Pr(η | γi), for i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
That is, the virtual event η depends only on the events γ1, . . . , γn and is independent of
every event α given γi , for i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that the likelihoods Pr(η | γ1), . . . ,Pr(η | γn) are not essential for the virtual evi-
dence method, but the likelihood ratios Pr(η | γ1) : · · · : Pr(η | γn) are. Note also that the
assumption given by Eq. (5) is needed to uniquely define the posterior distribution Pr(· | η)
as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Given the constraint in Eq. (4), and the assumption of Eq. (5), we have:
Pr(α | η) =
∑n
i=1 λiPr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
. (6)
Hence, under the assumption of Eq. (5), the virtual evidence method is able to reduce
the incorporation of uncertain evidence into that of incorporating certain evidence using
Bayes’ conditioning.
The virtual evidence method is a generalization of Pearl’s method of virtual evidence,
which Pearl proposed in the context of Bayesian belief networks [11]. The closed form of
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this method as given by Eq. (6) for arbitrary probability distributions is original as far as
we know.
We now show an example of using the virtual evidence method.
Example 2 (Due to Pearl). Assume that we are concerned with whether the alarm of
Mr. Holmes’ house is triggered (values a and a¯), and whether there is burglary at his
house (values b and b¯). Our original state of belief is given by the distribution Pr:
Pr(a, b)= 0.000095, Pr(a, b¯) = 0.009999,
Pr(a¯, b) = 0.000005, Pr(a¯, b¯) = 0.989901.
This means that on any given day, there is a burglary at Mr. Holmes’ house with probability
Pr(b) = 1 × 10−4. One day, Mr. Holmes receives a call from his neighbor, Mrs. Gibbons,
saying she may have heard the alarm of his house being triggered. Since Mrs. Gibbons
suffers from a hearing problem, Mr. Holmes concludes that there is an 80% chance that
Mrs. Gibbons did hear the alarm triggered. This can be interpreted as follows: the prob-
ability that Mrs. Gibbons will make the call given that the alarm has triggered is 4 times
the probability that Mrs. Gibbons will make the call given that the alarm did not trigger.
This uncertain evidence can be recast as hard evidence on the virtual event η (the event of
Mrs. Gibbons calling), with likelihood ratios λa : λa¯ = Pr(η | a) : Pr(η | a¯) = 4 : 1. We can
apply Eq. (6) and obtain the new distribution Pr(· | η):
Pr(a, b | η) ≈ 0.000369, Pr(a, b¯ | η) ≈ 0.038820,
Pr(a¯, b | η) ≈ 0.000005, Pr(a¯, b¯ | η) ≈ 0.960806.
Therefore, the new probability that there is a burglary at Mr. Holmes’ house after revising
our beliefs given this piece of virtual evidence is Pr(b | η) ≈ 3.74 × 10−4.
4. Comparing the revision methods
From the illustrations of the two belief revision methods, Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s
method of virtual evidence, we can see that a belief revision method can be broken into two
parts: a formal constraint that is used to specify the uncertain evidence, and a principle of
belief revision that commits to a unique distribution among many which satisfy the eviden-
tial constraint. For example, Jeffrey’s rule specifies evidence using posterior probabilities,
while Pearl’s method specifies evidence using likelihood ratios; Jeffrey’s rule obeys the
principle of probability kinematics explicitly, while in Pearl’s method, beliefs are revised
by conditioning on a virtual event η. In this section, we will compare the two revision
methods with respect to these two parts, and consequently show how we can translate be-
tween the two methods. Moreover, we will also show how we can apply these two methods
in the context of belief networks.
4.1. Pearl’s method and probability kinematics
Our first result shows that the principle of belief revision underlying Pearl’s method
does indeed satisfy the principle of probability kinematics. Therefore, it actually uses the
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same belief revision principle as Jeffrey’s rule, and what they only differ in is how uncertain
evidence is specified.
Theorem 3. The probability distribution Pr(· | η) given in Definition 3 is obtained from
the original distribution Pr by probability kinematics on the set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn.
Theorem 3 clarifies one misconception that Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method are two
different belief revision methods. In fact, what they differ in is not how beliefs are revised
as they both obey the principle of probability kinematics, but in the constraint that is used to
specify evidence. We will next show how we can easily translate between the two different
evidence specification methods.
4.2. From Pearl’s method to Jeffrey’s rule
First, we show how we can translate from the evidential constraint used by Pearl’s
method into one used by Jeffrey’s rule.
Theorem 4. Suppose that we have an original distribution Pr and some uncertain evidence
η bearing on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn, and suppose
further that such evidence is specified by likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn such that:
Pr(η | γ1) : · · · : Pr(η | γn) = λ1 : · · · : λn.
The new posterior distribution Pr(· | η) proposed by the virtual evidence method (Defini-
tion 3) can be obtained using Jeffrey’s rule (Definition 2) given that the uncertain evidence
is specified by the following set of posterior probabilities:
Pr′(γi) = qi = Pr(γi | η), for i = 1, . . . , n. (7)
We now illustrate the translation from Pearl’s method to Jeffrey’s rule in Theorem 4 by
revisiting Example 2.
Example 3. In Example 2, the new distribution Pr(· | η) is obtained from the original distri-
bution Pr by applying revision using Pearl’s method. By Eq. (7), the equivalent distribution
Pr′ = Pr(· | η) can be obtained by applying Jeffrey’s rule, given uncertain evidence speci-
fied by the following set of posterior probabilities:
Pr′(a) = Pr(a | η)
= λaPr(a)
λaPr(a)+ λa¯Pr(a¯) (using Eq. (6))
= 4 × 0.010094
4 × 0.010094+ 1 × 0.989906
≈ 0.039189;
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Pr′(a¯) = Pr(a¯ | η)
= λa¯Pr(a¯)
λaPr(a)+ λa¯Pr(a¯) (using Eq. (6))
= 1 × 0.989906
4 × 0.010094+ 1 × 0.989906
≈ 0.960811.
4.3. From Jeffrey’s rule to Pearl’s method
We now show how we can translate from the evidential constraint used by Jeffrey’s rule
into one used by Pearl’s method.
Theorem 5. Suppose that we have an original distribution Pr and some uncertain evidence
bearing on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn, and suppose fur-
ther that such evidence is specified by a set of posterior probabilities:
Pr′(γi) = qi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
The new posterior distribution Pr′ proposed by Jeffrey’s rule (Definition 2) can be ob-
tained using the virtual evidence method (Definition 3) given that the uncertain evidence
is specified by the following likelihood ratios:
λ1 : · · · : λn = q1Pr(γ1) : · · · :
qn
Pr(γn)
. (8)
We now illustrate the translation from Jeffrey’s rule to Pearl’s method in Theorem 5 by
revisiting Example 1.
Example 4. In Example 1, the new distribution Pr′ is obtained from the original distrib-
ution Pr by applying revision using Jeffrey’s rule. By Eq. (8), the equivalent distribution
Pr(· | η) = Pr′ can be obtained by applying Pearl’s method, given virtual evidence η spec-
ified by the following likelihood ratios:
λg : λb : λv = Pr
′(cg)
Pr(cg)
: Pr
′(cb)
Pr(cb)
: Pr
′(cv)
Pr(cv)
= 0.7
0.3
: 0.25
0.3
: 0.05
0.4
= 7 : 2.5 : 0.375.
4.4. Revision in belief networks
In this subsection, we describe the procedure of applying belief revision in belief net-
works [11]. A belief network (or Bayesian network) is a graphical probabilistic model,
composed of two parts: a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent variables, and a set
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of conditional probability tables (CPTs), one for each variable [10,11]. The CPT of variable
X with parents U defines a set of conditional probabilities of the form Pr(x | u), where x
is a value of variable X, and u is an instantiation of parents U. Given a network structure
and the set of CPTs, a unique probability distribution is defined, and we can compute any
probabilistic queries by performing inference on the network.
4.4.1. Pearl’s method in belief networks
The method of revision by virtual evidence was first introduced by Pearl in the context
of belief networks [11]. Suppose that we have some virtual evidence η bearing on variable
Y in a belief network, which has values y1, . . . , yn. This virtual evidence is represented in
the belief network by adding an auxiliary variable Z, and a directed edge Y → Z, where
one value of Z, say z, corresponds to the virtual event η. This ensures the key assumption
described by Eq. (5), that the virtual event z is independent of every event α given yi , i.e.,
Pr(z | yi, α) = Pr(z | yi), for i = 1, . . . , n, which follows from the independence semantics
of belief networks [11]. The uncertainty of evidence is quantified by the likelihood ratios
λ1, . . . , λn, and the CPT of variable Z is assigned such that Pr(z | y1) : · · · : Pr(z | yn) =
λ1 : · · · : λn.1 Finally, we accommodate the presence of the virtual event z by asserting the
observation Z = z in the belief network. We now show a simple example.
Example 5. We can represent our probability distribution in Example 2 using a belief net-
work with two variables: Alarm, which represents whether the alarm of Mr. Holmes’ house
is triggered (values a and a¯); and Burglary, which represents whether there is a burglary
at his house (values b and b¯). To represent the influence between the two variables, there
is a directed edge from Burglary to Alarm. The CPTs of Alarm and Burglary are given
by: Pr(a | b) = 0.95, meaning the alarm is triggered if there is a burglary with probability
0.95; Pr(a | b¯) = 0.01, meaning the alarm is triggered if there is no burglary with proba-
bility 0.01; and Pr(b) = 1 × 10−4, meaning on any given day, there is a burglary at Mr.
Holmes’ house with probability 1 × 10−4. The probability distribution generated by this
belief network is the same as our state of belief Pr shown in Example 2.
Now suppose we know that Mr. Holmes receives a call from his neighbor, Mrs. Gibbons,
saying she may have heard the alarm of his house being triggered, and concludes that there
is an 80% chance that Mrs. Gibbons did hear the alarm triggered. This uncertain evidence
can be recast as hard evidence on the virtual event η, with likelihood ratios λa : λa¯ = 4 : 1.
To incorporate this virtual evidence into the belief network, we add the auxiliary variable
Z, and the directed edge Alarm → Z (see Fig. 1), where the value z of Z corresponds to
the virtual event η, and the CPT of Z is assigned such that Pr(z | a) : Pr(z | a¯) = 4 : 1. For
example, we can assign Pr(z | a) = 0.4 and Pr(z | a¯) = 0.1. After asserting the observation
Z = z in the belief network, we can easily compute any probabilistic queries by performing
inference. For example, the probability that there is a burglary at Mr. Holmes’ house is now
Pr(b | z) ≈ 3.74 × 10−4.
1 There are more than one CPT for Z that satisfies this condition.
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4.4.2. Jeffrey’s rule in belief networks
There is no known proposal for applying Jeffrey’s rule in the context of belief networks.
However, because of our earlier results on the translation between Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s
method, we immediately get a proposal for this purpose, as we can first translate the evi-
dential constraint used by Jeffrey’s rule into one used by the virtual evidence method using
Theorem 5, and then perform belief revision by the procedure shown above. We now show
a simple example.
Example 6. We can represent our probability distribution in Example 1 using a belief
network with two variables: Color, which represents the color of the cloth (with values cg ,
cb and cv); and Sold, which represents whether the cloth is sold on the next day (with values
s and s¯). To represent the influence between the two variables, there is a directed edge
from Color to Sold. The CPTs of the variables are given by: (Pr(cg),Pr(cb),Pr(cv)) =
(0.3,0.3,0.4); and Pr(s | cg) = 0.4, Pr(s | cb) = 0.4, and Pr(s | cv) = 0.8. The probability
distribution generated by this belief network is the same as our state of belief Pr shown in
Example 1.
Now suppose that we inspect the cloth by candlelight, and conclude that our new state
of belief on the color of the cloth should be (Pr′(cg),Pr′(cb),Pr′(cv)) = (0.7,0.25,0.05).
To incorporate this uncertain evidence into the belief network, we first have to interpret
the inspection of the cloth by candlelight as virtual evidence. In Example 4, we show how
we can translate this evidential constraint into one used by the virtual evidence method.
The uncertain evidence can now be recast as virtual event η, with likelihood ratios λg : λb :
λv = 7 : 2.5 : 0.375. We can now follow the procedure of incorporating virtual evidence:
we first add an auxiliary variable Z as a child of variable Color, then assign the CPT of Z
with values consistent with the likelihood ratios, and finally assert the observation of the
virtual event.
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5. Interpreting evidential statementsWe now turn our attention to the investigation of the evidence specification protocols
adopted by Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method in relation to the problem of formally inter-
preting evidential statements.2 Consider the following statement as an example:
“Looking at this evidence, I am willing to bet 2 : 1 that David is not the killer”.
This statement can be formally interpreted using either protocol. For example, if α denotes
the event that David is not the killer, this statement can be interpreted in two ways:
(1) After accepting the evidence, the probability that David is not the killer becomes twice
the probability that David is the killer: Pr′(α) = 2/3 and Pr′(α¯) = 1/3;
(2) The probability that I will see this evidence η given that David is not the killer is twice
the probability that I will see it given that David is the killer: Pr(η | α) : Pr(η | α¯) =
2 : 1.
The first interpretation translates directly into a formal piece of evidence, Jeffrey’s style,
and can be characterized as an “All things considered” interpretation since it is a statement
about the agent’s final beliefs, which are a function of both his prior beliefs and the evi-
dence [12]. On the other hand, the second interpretation translates directly into a formal
piece of evidence, Pearl’s style, and can be characterized as a “Nothing else considered”
interpretation since it is a statement about the evidence only [12].
The two interpretations can lead to contradictory conclusions about the evidence. For
example, if we use the “Nothing else considered” approach to interpret our statement, we
will conclude that the evidence is against David being the killer. However, if we use the
“All things considered” interpretation, it is not clear whether the evidence is for or against
David being the killer, unless we know the original probability that David is the killer.
If, for example, David is one of four suspects who are equally likely to be the killer, our
original state of belief is Pr(α) = 3/4. Therefore, this evidence has actually increased the
probability that David is the killer! Because of this, Pearl argued for the “Nothing else
considered” interpretation, as it provides a summary of the evidence alone, and discussed
how people tend to use betting odds to quantify their beliefs even when they are based on
the evidence only [12].
Example 2 provides another opportunity to illustrate the subtlety involved in interpret-
ing evidential statements. The evidential statement in this case is “Mr. Holmes concludes
that there is an 80% chance that Mrs. Gibbons did hear the alarm triggered”. Interpret-
ing this statement using the “All things considered” approach gives us the conclusion that
Pr′(a) : Pr′(a¯) = 4 : 1, where a denotes the event that the alarm has been triggered. This
interpretation assumes that the 4 : 1 ratio applies to the posterior beliefs in a and a¯, after
Mr. Holmes has accommodated the evidence provided by Mrs. Gibson. However, in Ex-
ample 2, this statement was given a “Nothing else considered” interpretation, as by Pearl
2 This section is a summary of Pearl’s discussions on this issue [12], in the context of the approach we take in
this paper by dividing the belief revision process into a evidence specification method and a revision principle.
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[11, pp. 44–47], where the 4 : 1 ratio is taken as a quantification of the evidence strength,
i.e., the statement is interpreted as Pr(η | a) : Pr(η | a¯) = 4 : 1, where η is the evidence. In
fact, the two interpretations will lead to two different probability distributions, and hence,
give us different results for probabilistic queries. For example, if we use the “All things
considered” approach in interpreting this evidential statement, the probability of having a
burglary is Pr′(b) = 7.53 × 10−3, which is much larger than the probability we get using
the “Nothing else considered” approach in Example 2, which is Pr(b | η) = 3.74 × 10−4.
From the discussions above, the formal interpretation of evidential statements appears
to be a non-trivial task, which can be sensitive to context and communication protocols.
Regardless of how this is accomplished though, we need to stress that the process of map-
ping an informal evidential statement into a revised probability distribution involves three
distinct elements:
(1) One must adopt a formal method for specifying evidence.
(2) One must interpret the informal evidential statement as a formal piece of evidence,
according to the evidence specification method.
(3) One must apply a revision, by mapping the original probability distribution and formal
piece of evidence into a new distribution, according to a belief revision principle.
As we have shown previously, Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method both employ the same
belief revision principle, i.e., the principle of probability kinematics. Moreover, although
they adopt different formal methods of specifying evidence, one can translate between the
two methods.
6. Virtual evidence and Bayes factors
In this section, we aim to clarify the virtual evidence method by relating it to some
classical concepts in probability theory. Before doing so, we first define the notion of odds.
Definition 4. Given events α and β , the odds of α given β is defined as:3
O(α | β) def= Pr(α | β)
Pr(α¯ | β) . (9)
In quantifying the strength of some evidence η on a hypotheses γ , we often compute
the ratio of the odds of γ before and after accepting the evidence, O(γ | η)/O(γ ). This
ratio is called the odds factor in favor of γ by η [6], and its logarithm is called the weight
of evidence η in favor of γ [6]. We now show a classical result of how this odds factor can
be computed.
3 Here, the odds are defined only if Pr(β) = 0.
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Theorem 6 [5,6]. The odds factor O(γ | η)/O(γ ) is equal to the likelihood ratio Pr(η |
γ )/Pr(η | γ¯ ), i.e.:
O(γ | η)
O(γ )
= Pr(η | γ )
Pr(η | γ¯ ) . (10)
Therefore, from Eq. (10), if we are given virtual evidence η on events γ and γ¯ , the like-
lihood ratio Pr(η | γ )/Pr(η | γ¯ ) serves as a measure of the strength of the virtual evidence
η on the hypotheses γ .
If we are given the general case where we have uncertain evidence on a set of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn, where n > 2, we need to expand our notion of
odds factor in the following sense.
Definition 5. The odds of αi against αj given β is defined as the probability ratio:
O(αi : αj | β) def= Pr(αi | β)Pr(αj | β) . (11)
We can now in turn define the odds factor in favor of γi against γj by η with the ratio
O(γi : γj | η)/O(γi : γj ). This ratio of new-to-old odds is called the Bayes factor [5,6,9].
The formal definition of the Bayes factor is given as follows.
Definition 6. Given two distributions Pr and Pr′, the Bayes factor for events γi and γj is
defined as:
FPr′,Pr(γi : γj ) def=
O ′(γi : γj )
O(γi : γj ) =
Pr′(γi)/Pr′(γj )
Pr(γi)/Pr(γj )
. (12)
In fact, one can revise beliefs using the notion of Bayes factors. We first specify uncer-
tain evidence on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events γ1, . . . , γn by providing
the Bayes factor for every pair of events γi and γj , then commit to the principle of probabil-
ity kinematics for belief revision. One interesting property of this method of specification
is that Bayes factors do not constrain the prior distribution Pr, i.e., any uncertain evidence
specified by Bayes factors is compatible with every distribution Pr.4 Hence, they are suit-
able for a “Nothing else considered” interpretation of evidential statements.
In fact, we can show that this revision method using Bayes factors corresponds to the
virtual evidence method. This has a number of implications. First, it provides an alternative
and more classical semantics for the virtual evidence method. Second, it again confirms that
the virtual evidence method obeys the principle of probability kinematics. Finally, it shows
that revisions by the virtual evidence method are commutative, as we will illustrate later.
The following theorem shows how we can easily find the Bayes factors when we specify
uncertain evidence using virtual evidence.
4 This is not true if we use ratios of probabilities instead of ratios of odds. For example, if Pr′(α) = 2Pr(α), we
must have Pr(α) 0.5 because Pr′(α) 1 [13].
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Theorem 7. Let Pr(· | η) and Pr be the two distributions given in Definition 3. We then
have:
FPr(·|η),Pr(γi : γj ) = λi
λj
, for i, j = 1, . . . , n. (13)
Therefore, we can obtain the same distribution as Pr(· | η) if we specify the uncertain
evidence with the Bayes factor λi/λj for every pair of events γi and γj , as shown in
Eq. (13), and then revise our beliefs according to the principle of probability kinematics.
The advantage of using the virtual evidence method for specifying uncertain evidence is
that we only need to specify the n likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn in order to define the n2
Bayes factors that are necessary for belief revision.
6.1. Reasoning about evidence
As we have said before, the virtual evidence method can be interpreted as a “Nothing
else considered” revision method, and does not depend on one’s prior beliefs. In fact, this
specification of evidence can be reasoned about and interpreted even when we do not have
any prior beliefs. We will illustrate this by the following example due to Halpern and
Pucella [7].
Assume that Alice has two coins, a fair one and a double-headed one. If she non-
probabilistically chooses one of them and tosses it repeatedly, what is the probability of
landing heads in a single toss? Without knowing which coin she chooses (and how she
chooses it), the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the probability is either 1/2 (if
the fair coin is chosen), or 1 (if the double-headed coin is chosen).
Now assume that we know the results of the first 100 tosses, and all of them landed
heads. What is the probability that the next coin toss lands heads? We can again conclude
that it is still either 1/2 or 1 depending on which coin is used, as either coin cannot be
ruled out from our observation. This is hardly useful because no matter how many of these
consecutive tosses that landed heads we witness, the probability that the next toss will land
heads remains unchanged, when in fact the probability of the coin being double-headed
should increase.
However, this piece of evidential information can be easily expressed and used if we
interpret it as virtual evidence. If we denote the event γ as the coin being double-headed,
the event γ¯ as the coin being fair, and the virtual event η as the coin landing heads in a
single toss, we can quantify the evidence strength by computing the likelihood ratio:
Pr(η | γ )
Pr(η | γ¯ ) =
1
1/2
= 2.
Therefore, this piece of evidence is in favor of the coin being double-headed, no matter
what our prior beliefs are. If we witness 100 tosses landing heads, the likelihood ratio
of this observation is 2100, which means it is very strongly in favor of the coin being
double-headed. Obviously, it is still not possible to determine the posterior probability of
the coin being double-headed without knowing its prior probability. For example, we will
still believe the coin tossed is unlikely to be double-headed if its prior probability is 10−100.
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The advantage of specifying evidential information using virtual evidence is that the ev-
idence can be shared among different agents with different prior beliefs (even those without
prior beliefs), and it will be interpreted the same way by the different agents because the
specification depends only on the evidence but not the prior beliefs. The likelihood ratios
specified in the virtual evidence method capture completely whether the uncertain evidence
is in favor or against a hypotheses, and also its strength. Recently, Halpern and Pucella
proposed a logic for reasoning about evidence [7], which essentially views evidence as a
confirmation function from the prior beliefs before making the observation, to the posterior
beliefs after making the observation. The measure of evidence they use is the likelihood
ratio, because it is the only function that does not assume that we have any prior beliefs on
the hypotheses.
6.2. Commutativity of iterated revisions
We now discuss the problem of the commutativity of iterated revisions, i.e., whether the
order in which we accept uncertain evidence matters.5
It is well known that iterated revisions by Jeffrey’s rule are not commutative [4]. As a
simple example, assume that we are given a piece of uncertain evidence which suggests that
the probability of event α is 0.7, followed by another piece of uncertain evidence which
suggests that the probability of α is 0.8. After accepting both pieces of evidence in this
particular order using Jeffrey’s rule, we believe that the probability of α is 0.8. However,
if the reversed order of revision is employed, we believe that the probability of α is 0.7.
In general, even if we are given pieces of uncertain evidence on different events, iterated
revisions by Jeffrey’s rule are not commutative.
This was viewed as a problematic aspect of Jeffrey’s rule for a long time, until clarified
recently by Wagner [13]. First, Wagner observed and stressed that the evidence specifica-
tion method adopted by Jeffrey is suitable for the “All things considered” interpretation of
evidential statements. Moreover, he argued convincingly that when evidential statements
carry this interpretation, they must not be commutative to start with. So the lack of commu-
tativity is not a problem of the revision method, but a property of the evidence specification
method.
On the other hand, revisions by the virtual evidence method is commutative, and this is
supported by Wagner, which suggested specifying evidence based on Bayes factors leads
to commutativity [13]. Interestingly enough, he showed that when evidence is specified by
Bayes factors and the revision method obeys the principle of probability kinematics, belief
revision becomes commutative.6 These two properties are satisfied by the virtual evidence
method, as shown in earlier sections.
5 There is a key distinction between iterated revisions using certain evidence versus uncertain evidence. In the
former case, pieces of evidence may be logically inconsistent, which adds another dimension of complexity to
the problem [3], leading to different properties and treatments.
6 Wagner shows not only that the representation of uncertain evidence using Bayes factors is sufficient for
commutativity, but in a large number of cases, necessary.
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7. Bounding belief change induced by probability kinematicsOne important question relating to belief revision is that of measuring the extent to
which a revision disturbs existing beliefs. We have recently proposed a distance measure
defined between two probability distributions which can be used to bound the amount
of belief change induced by a revision [1]. We review this measure next and then use
it to provide guarantees on any revision which is based on the principle of probability
kinematics.7
Definition 7 [1]. Let Pr and Pr′ be two probability distributions over the same set of worlds
ω. We define a measure D(Pr,Pr′) as follows:
D(Pr,Pr′) def= ln max
ω
Pr′(ω)
Pr(ω)
− ln min
ω
Pr′(ω)
Pr(ω)
, (14)
where 0/0 is defined as 1. This measure can also be expressed using Bayes factors:
D(Pr,Pr′) = ln max
ωi ,ωj
FPr′,Pr(ωi : ωj ). (15)
This measure satisfies the three properties of distance: positiveness, symmetry, and the
triangle inequality. It is useful to compute this distance measure between two probability
distributions as it allows us to bound the difference in the beliefs captured by them.
Theorem 8 [1,2]. Let Pr and Pr′ be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds. Let α and β be two events. We have the following bound:
e−D(Pr,Pr′)  O
′(α | β)
O(α | β)  e
D(Pr,Pr′), (16)
where O(α | β) is the odds of α given β under Pr, and O ′(α | β) is the odds of α given β
under Pr′. The bound is tight in the sense that for every pair of distributions Pr and Pr′,
there are events α and β such that
O ′(α | β)
O(α | β) = e
D(Pr,Pr′); O
′(α¯ | β)
O(α¯ | β) = e
−D(Pr,Pr′).
According to Theorem 8, if we are given a belief revision method, and are able to
compute the distance measure between the original and revised distributions, we can get a
tight bound on the new probability of any conditional event after the belief revision, given
its original probability, using Eq. (16). Compared with other popular measures such as KL-
divergence and Euclidean distance, this distance measure is the only one that can bound
belief change in the precise way of providing a tight bound on the new probability of any
conditional event [1,2].
7 The results in this section are reformulations and generalizations of previous results [1,2], and are inspired by
a new understanding of Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method as two belief revision methods based on the principle of
probability kinematics, and the understanding of Pearl’s method in terms of Bayes factors. Proofs of theorems in
this section are included in Appendix A for the purpose of completeness.
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We now compute the distance measure for belief revision methods based on the princi-
ple of probability kinematics.
Theorem 9 [1,2]. If Pr′ is obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on γ1, . . . , γn, the
distance measure between Pr and Pr′ is given by
D(Pr,Pr′) = ln nmax
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
− ln nmin
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
. (17)
Using Eq. (17), we can easily compute the distance measure for revisions based on
Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method.
Corollary 1. If Pr′ is obtained from Pr by applying Jeffrey’s rule, given uncertain evidence
specified by the set of posterior probabilities Pr′(γi) = qi , for i = 1, . . . , n, the distance
measure between Pr and Pr′ is given by
D(Pr,Pr′) = ln nmax
i=1
qi
Pr(γi)
− ln nmin
i=1
qi
Pr(γi)
. (18)
Corollary 2. If Pr(· | η) is obtained from Pr by applying Pearl’s method, given virtual
evidence η specified by likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn, the distance measure between Pr and
Pr(· | η) is given by
D
(
Pr,Pr(· | η))= ln nmax
i=1
λi − ln
n
min
i=1 λi . (19)
The significance of Corollaries 1 and 2 is that we can compute the distance measure
easily in both cases. For Jeffrey’s rule, we can compute the distance measure by knowing
only the prior and posterior probabilities of events γ1, . . . , γn. For Pearl’s method, we can
compute the distance measure by knowing only the likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn. For both
revision methods, the distance measure can be computed in constant time from the uncer-
tain evidence, and we can guarantee a bound on the belief change due to the fact that they
both obey the principle of probability kinematics, without explicitly knowing the original
and posterior distributions.
We close this section by showing that the principle of probability kinematics is optimal
in a very precise sense: it commits to a probability distribution that minimizes the distance
measure.
Theorem 10 [1,2]. The distribution Pr′ obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on
γ1, . . . , γn is optimal in the following sense. Among all possible distributions that agree
with Pr′ on the probabilities of events γ1, . . . , γn, Pr′ is the closest to Pr according to the
distance measure given by Definition 7.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed two main methods for revising probability distributions given
uncertain evidence: Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method of virtual evidence. We were able
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to analyze the process of belief revision according to three different aspects: the formal
specification of evidence, the belief revision principle, and the interpretation of informal
evidential statements. We showed that both Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s method obey the
belief revision principle of probability kinematics, with the difference in the manner in
which they specify uncertain evidence: a set of posterior probabilities are used in Jeffrey’s
rule, while likelihood ratios are used in Pearl’s method. We also showed how we can eas-
ily translate between the two specification of uncertain evidence, and with this result, we
can implement both methods in the context of belief networks by adding virtual evidence
nodes. For the much debated problem of interpreting informal evidential statements, we
emphasized that the two methods commit to two different interpretations of evidence, and
thus can lead to different conclusions about the evidential statement.
Moreover, we showed that the virtual evidence method can be reformulated in terms of
Bayes factors, which implies a number of results, including the ability to reason and share
evidential information among agents with different prior beliefs, and the commutativity of
iterated revisions. Finally, we showed that revisions based on the principle of probability
kinematics are optimal in a very precise way, and pointed to a distance measure for bound-
ing belief change due to these revisions. Our bounds included Jeffrey’s rule and Pearl’s
method as special cases.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Given the distribution Pr′ in Eq. (3), since events γ1, . . . , γn are
mutually exclusive, we have:
Pr′(γi) = qi Pr(γi)Pr(γi) = qi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
satisfying Eq. (2), and:
Pr′(α, γi) = qi Pr(α, γi)Pr(γi) , for i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, Pr′ is obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on γ1, . . . , γn, i.e., it satisfies
Eq. (1), since:
Pr′(α | γi) = Pr
′(α, γi)
Pr′(γi)
= qi
Pr(α,γi)
Pr(γi)
qi
= Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
= Pr(α | γi), for i = 1, . . . , n.
On the other hand, if there is a distribution Pr′ that satisfies both Eqs. (1) and (2), the
probability of event α under Pr′ must be:
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′
n∑ ′ ′
n∑ n∑ Pr(α, γi)Pr (α) =
i=1
Pr (α | γi)Pr (γi) =
i=1
Pr(α | γi)qi =
i=1
qi Pr(γi)
. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We want to prove that the distribution given by Eq. (6) is the unique
distribution Pr(· | η) identified by the virtual evidence method in Definition 3. First of all,
if there is a distribution Pr(· | η) that satisfies both Eqs. (4) and (5), the probability of event
α under distribution Pr(· | η) must be:
Pr(α | η) = Pr(α, η)
Pr(η)
=
∑n
i=1 Pr(α, η, γi)
Pr(η)
=
∑n
i=1 Pr(η | γi, α)Pr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 Pr(η | γj )Pr(γj )
=
∑n
i=1 Pr(η | γi)Pr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 Pr(η | γj )Pr(γj )
=
∑n
i=1 (λi/k)Pr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 (λj /k)Pr(γj )
=
∑n
i=1 λiPr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
.
On the other hand, given a distribution which satisfies Eq. (6), since events γ1, . . . , γn are
mutually exclusive, we have:
Pr(η | γ1) : · · · : Pr(η | γn) = Pr(η, γ1)Pr(γ1) : · · · :
Pr(η, γn)
Pr(γn)
= Pr(γ1 | η)Pr(η)
Pr(γ1)
: · · · : Pr(γn | η)Pr(η)
Pr(γn)
=
λ1Pr(γ1)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
Pr(η)
Pr(γ1)
: · · · :
λnPr(γn)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
Pr(η)
Pr(γn)
= λ1 : · · · : λn,
satisfying Eq. (4). Therefore, λi = kPr(η | γi), where k is a constant, and Eq. (5) is also
satisfied since:
Pr(η | γi, α) = Pr(η, γi, α)Pr(γi, α) =
Pr(γi, α | η)Pr(η)
Pr(γi, α)
=
λiPr(γi ,α)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
Pr(η)
Pr(γi, α)
= λiPr(η)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
= kPr(η | γi)Pr(η)∑n
j=1 kPr(η | γj )Pr(γj )
= Pr(η | γi)Pr(η)∑n
j=1 Pr(η | γj )Pr(γj )
= Pr(η | γi)Pr(η)
Pr(η)
= Pr(η | γi), for i = 1, . . . , n. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Given the distribution Pr(· | η) in Eq. (6), since events γ1, . . . , γn
are mutually exclusive, we have:
Pr(γi | η) = λiPr(γi)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
, for i = 1, . . . , n,
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and:Pr(α, γi | η) = λiPr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, Pr(· | η) is obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on γ1, . . . , γn, i.e., it
satisfies Eq. (1), since:
Pr(α | γi, η) = Pr(α, γi | η)Pr(γi | η) =
λiPr(α,γi)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
λiPr(γi)∑n
j=1 λjPr(γj )
= Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
= Pr(α | γi),
for i = 1, . . . , n. 
Proof of Theorem 4. From Eqs. (6) and (7), we have:
Pr′(γi) = qi = λiPr(γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
,
for i = 1, . . . , n. We can substitute the set of posterior probabilities into Jeffrey’s rule
(Eq. (3)), and get:
Pr′(α) =
n∑
i=1
qi
Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
=
n∑
i=1
λiPr(γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
=
∑n
i=1 λiPr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
.
This is exactly the distribution obtained by the virtual evidence method (Eq. (6)), with
likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn. 
Proof of Theorem 5. From Eq. (8), we have λi = kqi/Pr(γi), where k is a constant, for
i = 1, . . . , n, and we can substitute the likelihood ratios λ1, . . . , λn into Pearl’s method
(Eq. (6)), and get:
Pr(α | η) =
∑n
i=1 λiPr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 λj Pr(γj )
=
∑n
i=1 (kqi/Pr(γi))Pr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 (kqj/Pr(γj ))Pr(γj )
=
∑n
i=1 (qi/Pr(γi))Pr(α, γi)∑n
j=1 qj
=
n∑
i=1
qi
Pr(α, γi)
Pr(γi)
,
since
∑n
j=1 qj =
∑n
j=1 Pr′(γj ) = 1. This is exactly the distribution obtained by Jeffrey’s
rule (Eq. (3)), with the set of posterior probabilities Pr′(γi) = qi , for i = 1, . . . , n. 
Proof of Theorem 6. We have:
O(γ | η)
O(γ )
= Pr(γ | η)/Pr(γ¯ | η)
Pr(γ )/Pr(γ¯ )
= Pr(η, γ )/Pr(η, γ¯ )
Pr(γ )/Pr(γ¯ )
= Pr(η, γ )/Pr(γ )
Pr(η, γ¯ )/Pr(γ¯ )
= Pr(η | γ )
Pr(η | γ¯ ) . 
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Proof of Theorem 7. We have:FPr′,Pr(γi : γj ) = Pr
′(γi)/Pr′(γj )
Pr(γi)/Pr(γj )
=
( λiPr(γi)∑n
k=1 λkPr(γk)
)
/
( λjPr(γj )∑n
k=1 λkPr(γk)
)
Pr(γi)/Pr(γj )
= λi
λj
,
for i, j = 1, . . . , n 
Proof of Theorem 8. If Pr and Pr′ do not have the same support,8 we have D(Pr,Pr′) =
∞, and thus:
−∞ = e−D(Pr,Pr′)  O
′(α | β)
O(α | β)  e
D(Pr,Pr′) = ∞.
If they have the same support, let rω = Pr′(ω)/Pr(ω) for every world ω. The odds ratio
O ′(α | β)/O(α | β) can be expressed as:
O ′(α | β)
O(α | β) =
Pr′(α | β)/Pr′(α¯ | β)
Pr(α | β)/Pr(α¯ | β) =
Pr′(α,β)/Pr′(α¯, β)
Pr(α,β)/Pr(α¯, β)
= (
∑
ω|=α,β Pr′(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β Pr′(ω))
(
∑
ω|=α,β Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β Pr(ω))
= (
∑
ω|=α,β rωPr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β rωPr(ω))
(
∑
ω|=α,β Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β Pr(ω))
.
We now introduce maxω rω and minω rω to get the upper bound on the odds ratio:
O ′(α | β)
O(α | β) 
(
∑
ω|=α,β (maxω rω)Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β (minω rω)Pr(ω))
(
∑
ω|=α,β Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β Pr′(ω))
= maxω rω
minω rω
= maxω Pr
′(ω)/Pr(ω)
minω Pr′(ω)/Pr(ω)
.
Similarly, we can also get the lower bound on the odds ratio:
O ′(α | β)
O(α | β) 
(
∑
ω|=α,β (minω rω)Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β (maxω rω)Pr(ω))
(
∑
ω|=α,β Pr(ω))/(
∑
ω|=α¯,β Pr′(ω))
= minω rω
maxω rω
= minω Pr
′(ω)/Pr(ω)
maxω Pr′(ω)/Pr(ω)
.
We note that both results can be expressed using our distance measure:
eD(Pr,Pr
′) = maxω Pr
′(ω)/Pr(ω)
minω Pr′(ω)/Pr(ω)
;
e−D(Pr,Pr′) = minω Pr
′(ω)/Pr(ω)
maxω Pr′(ω)/Pr(ω)
.
8 Two probability distributions Pr and Pr′ have the same support, if for every world ω, Pr(ω) = 0 iff
Pr′(ω) = 0.
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Therefore, we have the following inequality:9e−D(Pr,Pr′)  O
′(α | β)
O(α | β)  e
D(Pr,Pr′).
The bound is tight in the sense that for every pair of distributions Pr and Pr′, there are
events α = ωi and β = ωi ∨ ωj , where ωi = arg maxω rω and ωj = arg minω rω, such that:
O ′(α | β) =
∑
ω|=α,β rωPr(ω)∑
ω|=α¯,β rωPr(ω)
= rωi Pr(ωi)
rωj Pr(ωj )
.
Since O(α | β) = Pr(ωi)/Pr(ωj ) and eD(Pr,Pr′) = (maxω rω)/(minω rω) = rωi /rωj , we
have:
O ′(α | β)
O(α | β) = e
D(Pr,Pr′).
Similarly, we can get:
O ′(α¯ | β)
O(α¯ | β) = e
−D(Pr,Pr′). 
Proof of Theorem 9. If the two sets of probabilities Pr(γ1), . . . ,Pr(γn) and Pr′(γ1), . . . ,
Pr′(γn) do not have the same support, there must exist some world ω where Pr(ω) = 0
and Pr′(ω) = 0 or Pr(ω) = 0 and Pr′(ω) = 0, and hence, the distributions Pr and Pr′ also
do not have the same support, giving us D(Pr,Pr′) = ∞ = ln maxni=1 (Pr′(γi)/Pr(γi)) −
ln minni=1 (Pr′(γi)/Pr(γi)). Otherwise, given a world ω where ω |= γi , from Eq. (1), we
have:
Pr′(ω)
Pr(ω)
= Pr
′(ω | γi)Pr′(γi)
Pr(ω | γi)Pr(γi) =
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
.
Therefore, the distance measure can be computed by:
D(Pr,Pr′) = ln max
ω
Pr′(ω)
Pr(ω)
− ln min
ω
Pr′(ω)
Pr(ω)
= ln nmax
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
− ln nmin
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Let Pr′′ be any distribution that satisfies the constraint, Pr′′(γi) =
Pr′(γi), for i = 1, . . . , n. We would like to prove that D(Pr,Pr′′)  D(Pr,Pr′), where
Pr′ is obtained from Pr by probability kinematics on γ1, . . . , γn. If Pr and Pr′′ do
not have the same support, we have D(Pr,Pr′′) = ∞  D(Pr,Pr′). If they have the
same support, let j = arg maxni=1 (Pr′(γi)/Pr(γi)) and k = arg minni=1 (Pr′(γi)/Pr(γi)).
If rmax = maxω (Pr′′(ω)/Pr(ω)), we can write the following inequality:
9 If both O ′(α | β) and O(α | β) takes on either 0 or ∞, the theorem still holds if we define both 0/0 and ∞/∞
as 1.
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r Pr(γ ) =
∑
r Pr(ω)
∑ Pr′′(ω)
Pr(ω)max j
ω|=γj
max
ω|=γj Pr(ω)
=
∑
ω|=γj
Pr′′(ω) = Pr′′(γj ) = Pr′(γj ).
This gives us rmax  Pr′(γj )/Pr(γj ). Similarly, if rmin = minω (Pr′′(ω)/Pr(ω)), we can
write the following inequality:
rminPr(γk) =
∑
ω|=γk
rminPr(ω)
∑
ω|=γk
Pr′′(ω)
Pr(ω)
Pr(ω)
=
∑
ω|=γk
Pr′′(ω) = Pr′′(γk) = Pr′(γk).
This gives us rmin  Pr′(γk)/Pr(γk). Therefore, the distance measure between Pr and Pr′′
is:
D(Pr,Pr′′) = ln max
ω
Pr′′(ω)
Pr(ω)
− ln min
ω
Pr′′(ω)
Pr(ω)
= ln rmax − ln rmin
 ln Pr
′(γj )
Pr(γj )
− ln Pr
′(γk)
Pr(γk)
= ln nmax
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
− ln nmin
i=1
Pr′(γi)
Pr(γi)
= D(Pr,Pr′).
Therefore, the distribution Pr′ gives us the smallest distance among all possible distribu-
tions that agree with Pr′ on the probabilities of events γ1, . . . , γn. 
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